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1 In so doing it is following in the footsteps of Lindert and Williamson (2001) .
Introduction
Does globalization lead to the world becoming a more equal place, or does it lead to the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer? This question has assumed ever-greater importance with the emergence of the WTO as a force for trade liberalization throughout the world, with Europe moving towards increased economic integration, with the collapse of communism and the opening up of previously autarkic economies, and with renewed speculation regarding the formation of a pan-American free trade area. The question is increasingly being raised by opponents of globalization, but public debate on the issue can be frustratingly confused. Protestors are often vague about what globalization is, and fail to recognize that globalization has different dimensions, which may have different effects on inequality. Most seriously, they often define 'globalization' as encompassing many different phenomena, some of which have little or nothing to do with globalization as economists would define it (Rodrik 2000) . Globalization as economists define it encompasses declining barriers to trade, migration, capital flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and technological transfers. This paper will restrict itself to exploring the historical links which have existed between trade, migration and capital flows, on the one hand, and inequality on the other. The paper will also distinguish between two separate dimensions of inequality: betweencountry inequality and within-country inequality.
1 If we take the appropriate unit of observation to be the individual citizen anywhere in the world, then total world inequality will clearly depend on both between-and within-country inequality, with globalization potentially affecting both through quite different channels. What these channels might be will be the subject of a theoretical overview in the following section. The paper will then trace the evolution of globalization during the 19 th and 2 20 th centuries, distinguishing between the different dimensions involved. The next section will briefly document both types of inequality trend over the past two centuries. Finally, the paper will explore in greater detail the inequality experiences of the two most dramatic globalization episodes, the late 19 th and late 20 th centuries, and document what is known about the links between globalization and inequality during these two periods. It will then conclude with suggestions for further research.
Globalization and inequality: theoretical connections

Globalization and Within-Country Inequality
Our intuitions regarding the links between international economic integration and income distribution arise for the most part from the static neoclassical trade theory developed by Eli
Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin in the early years of the 20 th century. Their basic insight was that trade patterns reflect differences in the distribution of endowments across countries, and that countries export goods embodying those factors of production with which they are well-endowed.
Commodity market integration therefore leads to an increase in the demand for abundant (and cheap) factors of production, thus raising their price, while trade leads to the demand for scarce (and expensive) factors of production falling, thus lowering their price.
In a simple two-country two-factor two-good setting, with identical technology in both countries, trade and factor mobility should have identical effects on factor prices, and hence on income distribution. If the US is abundant in skilled labour, and Mexico is abundant in unskilled labour, then trade will increase US skilled wages, and Mexican unskilled wages; and it will lower US unskilled wages, and Mexican skilled wages. Thus trade leads to greater wage inequality in the US, and lower wage inequality in Mexico. It is also true, of course, that the migration of unskilled workers from Mexico to the US, or of skilled workers from the US to Mexico, will have identical effects on factor prices.
Things get more complicated once we move away from this very simple 2x2x2 framework.
For example, if the US economy has superior technology, or superior endowments of a third factor of production, so that US skilled wages are higher than Mexican wages, rather than lower, then while trade and unskilled migration may both raise wage inequality in the US and lower it in Mexico as before, skilled migration will also be from South to North, and will have the opposite effect on wage inequality in the two countries. In this case, some dimensions of globalization (trade and unskilled migration) have very different implications for inequality than others (skilled migration).
Alternatively, it is important to recognize that not all developing countries (DCs) are identical: rather, they differ greatly in their endowments of capital, labour and skills (Davis 1996) . The implication is that a middle-income country such as Mexico might be skill-abundant relative to countries like China and India; they might therefore protect their unskilled-labour-abundant sectors; and they might thus see skill premia rising on liberalization. There is in fact evidence that unskilled-labourintensive sectors received the most protection in countries such as Mexico and Morocco prior to liberalisation (Currie and Harrison 1997; Hanson and Harrison 1999) .
A third possibility is that liberalization and FDI might lead to new skill-intensive activities being introduced into DCs (Feenstra and Hanson 1996) : under such circumstances, the relative demand for skilled labour would rise in the South. Finally, capital inflows to the DCs might increase the demand for skilled labour, if skilled labour is complementary to capital, and thus raise wage inequality; alternatively, if skilled labour and capital are complementary to some natural resource (e.g. minerals), then liberalization in a resource-rich DC might also increase skill premia and inequality overall (Kanbur 1999) .
Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the only factors influencing the impact of globalization on inequality are countries' endowments and their technology. There is another crucial factor, however, which should be mentioned: the distribution of those endowments among a country's citizens. Take for example a positive trade shock in a land-abundant country, which raises the returns to land. Clearly, if land holdings are concentrated among a few large land-owners, this shock is likely to be a force for greater inequality. On the other hand, if the land belonged exclusively to poor peasant proprietors, such a shock might well imply greater equality. The fact that trade theory implies a link between globalization and factor prices, rather than inequality per se, with the distribution of endowments intervening between the two, is one of the problems facing applied researchers seeking to explain the behaviour of summary inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient.
In conclusion: the links between globalization and within-country income distribution are ambiguous. First, globalization affects factor prices differently in different countries, for standard
Heckscher-Ohlin reasons. Second, different dimensions of globalization (e.g. trade versus factor flows) may have different implications for factor prices in a given country. Third, a given dimension of globalization (e.g. capital flows) may have ambiguous effects on factor prices in a given country, depending inter alia on patterns of complementarity or substitutability between factors of production. Finally, a given impact on factor prices can have different effects on inequality, depending on the distribution of endowments across individuals.
Ultimately, these are issues which can only be resolved empirically.
Globalization and Between-Country Inequality
Static trade-theoretic arguments suggest that globalization affects factor prices in the first instance. However, these arguments also have implications for between-country inequality, in that, other things being equal, factor price convergence should bring per capita incomes closer together.
Typically, however, between-country inequality is discussed in the context of dynamic growth theory, rather than static trade theory. Models endogenising the long-run growth rate, which have been developed in the past decade, are capable of deriving long-run growth effects of a number of policies, including trade policy. Their conclusion is that the implications of trade liberalization for convergence are theoretically ambiguous.
Numerous examples could be cited, but two will suffice. Both Stokey (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapters 6, 9) assume that North-South trade is driven by differences in relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labour; and both assume that trade drives factor price convergence, with wage inequality rising in the North and falling in the South. In Stokey's model, the growth mechanism is individuals investing in human capital: when trade leads to returns to skill in a small DC being lowered, this can reduce the incentive to acquire skills, and hence the DC growth rate. Trade may thus lead to divergence. However, Grossman and Helpman take the endowment of human capital as exogenous, and assume that human capital is useful in that it is an input into R&D, which drives the growth process. In such a scenario, trade which lowers DC skilled wages, and increases developed country skilled wages, boosts DC technical progress, and lowers developed country technical progress, in that the cost of innovation declines in the DC (and increases in the developed country): trade leads to convergence.
Once again, these issues can only be resolved empirically.
Trends in International Economic Integration
To casual commentators it seems obvious that today's globalization is unprecedented. London and Rangoon fell from 93% to 26% (Collins 1996) . CMI in the late 19 th century was both impressive in scale, and global in scope: indeed, Third World economies were becoming more rapidly integrated with the rest of the world than their Atlantic economy counterparts during this period (Williamson 2000) .
Transport costs continued to fall during the 20 th century, but at a slower rate. Isserlis (1938) provides Second, commodity markets are probably even better integrated today, but we do not have the empirical evidence to document this. Clearly, we need further research on this important issue.
International Capital Market Integration
Capital exports from the centre to the periphery were enormous in the late 19 in Romania, 13.5% in Singapore, 6% in Thailand, and 18.9% in the Sudan. By contrast, the equivalent figure for Argentina between 1910 and 1913 was 11%, while it was 14.5% in Canada.
Clearly, capital flows involving certain DCs were very high in both periods. U-shaped pattern is apparent in data on real and nominal interest-rate differentials Taylor 1998, 2001 ), while Taylor (1996) applies the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) test to historical data, and finds that global capital markets were better integrated between 1870 and 1924 than they were between 1970 and 1989.
What of the composition of these flows? Dunning (1993) However, the sectoral composition of capital flows has broadened, with far more going into industry and finance in the late 20 th century than was true of the earlier period. This is certainly true of portfolio flows. In terms of FDI flows, in 1914 about 55% of the accumulated FDI stock was in the primary product sector; 20% in railroads; 15% in manufacturing; and 10% in trade, distribution, public utilities and banking (Dunning 1993, p. 116) . By contrast, in the 1990s only about 6% of EU FDI went to the primary sector, but 31% to manufactures, and 63% to services (Baldwin and Martin 1999, p. 19) , while about half of US FDI is in services, and about 35% in manufacturing (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin 1999) . The issue is important, since FDI can serve as a vehicle for technological transfer and thus hasten international convergence, as it did in Ireland during the 1990s. The changing sectoral composition of FDI over time suggests that FDI is probably playing a more important role in this regard in the late 20 th century than it did in the late 19 th (although this is mere speculation).
Furthermore, the composition of portfolio flows has changed dramatically. In the late 19 th century such flows were overwhelmingly accounted for by bonds. During the lending boom of the 1970s, by contrast, bank lending accounted for almost two-thirds of the total flow, with both bond issues and portfolio equity flows being minimal. During the 1990s, the composition of flows has become far more balanced, with an almost equal split between direct and portfolio flows, and a fairly equal division within portfolio flows between bank lending, bond issues, and equity finance (World Bank 2000, p. 126 by 'free-standing companies', incorporated in the core in order to carry on business within the periphery, FDI today occurs overwhelmingly within multinational corporations which do business in both home and host countries.
International Migration
It is in the area of migration that the late 19 th century seems most clearly to have been more globalized than today. Although barriers to immigration were being erected by the end of the period (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, Chapter 10), by and large the late 19 th century stands out as a relatively liberal interlude in terms of migration policy; once transport costs had fallen sufficiently relative to the average wage, the inevitable consequence was a huge intercontinental flow of people.
Between 1820 and 1914, roughly 60 million Europeans emigrated to the New World; European emigration averaged 300,000 per annum in the three decades after 1846, more than doubled in the next two decades, and exceeded a million after the turn of the century (Hatton and Williamson 1998 There were also significant migrations within Europe and the New World, and emigration from Asia.
The UN has estimated that the world stock of migrants was 2.3% of the total world population in both 1965 and 1990 . Within Western Europe, the share of migrants in the total population increased from 3.6% to 6.1% over the same period, while within North America, the migrant share increased from 6% to 8.6% (Zlotnik 1999, (Hatton and Williamson 2001) .
The impact of migration on within-country inequality largely depends on the skill mix, as was suggested above. In the late 19 th century, migration predominantly involved young, unskilled adults, with very high labour force participation rates; it thus had a large potential impact on inequality, lowering it in Europe and raising it in the New World. As the late 20 th century progressed, the picture became increasingly similar, at least for the US: the skill profile of immigrants, relative to the 7 Indeed, a higher proportion of immigrants were high school dropouts in 1998 than in 1990, reversing a steady downward trend in this figure since 1960 (Borjas 1999, p. 21 
Inequality Trends
The previous section has documented a U-shaped trend in the extent of international The benchmark study of world income inequality trends over the past two centuries is a recent paper by François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson (1999) , which makes use of data on population, real GDP per capita, and vintile shares for 33 groups of countries between 1820 and 1992. Figure 2 plots the resulting Theil coefficients for total world inequality, as well as a decomposition into that portion explained by between-country inequality, and that portion explained by within-country inequality. Several key lessons emerge from the figure.
First, world inequality has increased substantially since 1820. figure) , or by 12%.
Second, the rise in total inequality over the period as a whole has been entirely driven by a rise in inequality between countries; indeed, within-country inequality declined over the period.
Between-country inequality rose continuously from 1820 to 1950; it fell during the 1950s and 1970s, but rose during the 1960s and 1980s, and rose over the post-1960 period as a whole. This confirms Pritchett's (1997) finding that divergence, rather than convergence, characterises the long run aggregate growth record.
Third, the cessation of the trend towards greater overall inequality during the interwar period was not due to more favourable between-country inequality trends, since between-country inequality continued to rise rapidly. Rather, it was due to a dramatic decline in within-country inequality, which fell from 0.500 in 1910 to 0.323 in 1950, a 0.177 decline (or 35%) in 4 decades, or a 0.044 point decline per decade. It seems as though this interwar experience was an aberration, since within-country inequality trended very gently and continuously upwards both before 1910 and after 1950. Over the period as a whole, within-country inequality has declined sharply, as a result of this apparent step decline during the interwar period, and this is in clear contrast to between-country inequality, which has increased sharply.
Fourth, while within-country inequality was the dominant force driving total world inequality in 1820, its relative importance has declined over time, and since World War 2 between-country 8 But see Milanovic (1999) for a contrary view, albeit one based on only two years (1988 and 1993); see also Dowrick and Akmal (2001 (1998, 2000) . These papers present data on w/r, the ratio of the unskilled, urban wage to the returns to agricultural land. This was the key relative factor price in an era when agriculture was still an important component of the economy, and in which inter-continental trade was largely dominated by the exchange of resource-and land-intensive products for labour-intensive products such as manufactured goods. Table 3 ). By 1910, the Australian ratio had fallen to one quarter of its 1870 level, the Argentine ratio had fallen to one-fifth of its mid-1880 level, and the US ratio had fallen to half of its 1870 level.
In Europe, the British ratio in 1910 had increased by a factor of 2.7 over its 1870 level; the Irish ratio had increased by a factor of 5.6; the Swedish ratio had increased by a factor of 2.6; and the Danish ratio by a factor of 3.1. This increase was less pronounced in protectionist economies: the ratio increased by a factor of 2.0 in France, 1.4 in Germany, and not at all in Spain.
The Heckscher-Ohlin predictions were also well born out by the experience of those Third
World countries which participated in the late 19 th century global economy (Williamson 2000, Table 4 ). In land-scarce economies such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the wage-rental ratio increased substantially, while it plummeted in land-abundant food exporting nations such as Argentina, Uruguay, Burma, Siam, Egypt and the Punjab. Relative factor price convergence was not limited to the present-day OECD region, it appears.
What was responsible for these trends, and in particular for the impressive wage-rental ratio convergence? O'Rourke, Taylor and Williamson (1996) explore this issue econometrically, using data for seven countries between 1875 and 1914: Australia, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and the US. The results are supportive of Heckscher and Ohlin: the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing prices has the expected negative effect on wage-rental ratios for five of the seven countries, the exceptions being Australia and Denmark. It appears that CMI was important in driving factor price convergence during this period.
Moreover, other dimensions of globalization also contributed to the wage-rental convergence; in particular, migration increased wage-rental ratios in Europe and lowered them in the New World. However, international capital flows were probably a force for divergence during this period, rather than convergence, in that capital flowed from low-wage Europe to the high-wage New World, exacerbating rather than moderating wage-rental ratio differences.
Factor Price Convergence and Inequality in the Late 19 th Century
What were the implications of these factor price movements for inequality? To a large extent, this depended on who owned the land. Typically, landowners were at the top of the income distribution, and so the globalization forces which raised wage-rental ratios in Europe should have made Europe more equal; while the same forces which lowered wage-rental ratios in the New Second, inequality rose not only in land-abundant areas such as Burma and Thailand, where wage-rental ratios fell, but also in land-scarce economies such as Japan and Taiwan, where wage-rental ratios rose. Presumably this anomaly is due to the fact that inequality trends were not just determined by globalization (and wage-rental ratios), but by other factors, such as demography and technological change, as well.
To summarize: there appears to be a causal relationship between globalization and withincountry inequality for this period. Trade did have an impact on wage-rental ratios, just as theory says it should. Moreover, Williamson (1997) shows that there is a strong relationship between migration flows and movements in w/y, with w/y rising more (falling less) in countries that experienced more emigration (less immigration). However, the episode shows that the links between globalization and distribution are subtle and varied, just as was suggested earlier. First, globalization did have different effects on factor prices and inequality in different continents: trade raised w/r in Europe and lowered it in the New World, and migration raised w/y in Europe, and lowered it in the New World. This has to be born in mind when inspecting the average inequality trends in Figure 2 : the dramatic egalitarian trends in some European countries during this period, and the equally dramatic inegalitarian trends in some New World countries at the same time, all of which were intimately linked to globalization, largely cancelled each other out in the aggregate. Thus, a regression of inequality on some measure of globalization which failed to take account of the very different links between the two variables in different continents might well incorrectly conclude that on balance there was no link between globalization and inequality. Second, different dimensions of globalization had different effects on distribution, with migration raising European wages (for example), and capital flows lowering them. Third, the impact of a given factor price change on inequality (e.g. a rise in the return to land in land-abundant countries) depended on the distribution of endowments, as the contrast between Burmese or Ghanaian peasants landowners, on the one hand, and Argentine estancia owners on the other, makes fairly clear.
Globalization and Between-Country Inequality
The previous sections have already touched on some themes relevant to the links between globalization and between-country convergence, so this section can be brief. Figure 2 suggested that between-country inequality rose substantially during the late 19 th century, a period of rapid globalization. Moreover, while relative factor prices were converging internationally, and while there was absolute factor price convergence within the Atlantic economy, globally there was absolute factor price divergence, at least insofar as real wages were concerned. According to Williamson (1998 , Tables 1, 2) , real wages in Japan, Burma, India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Thailand all fell further behind British wages during this period, reflecting superior European growth. The question now arises: was globalization responsible?
O'Rourke and Williamson (1997 Globalization thus helped several peripheral European countries converge on the core, while insufficient globalization helps to explain Iberia's failure to converge. The crucial factor was migration, which accounted for some 70% of the total convergence experienced in the Atlantic economy during the period (Taylor and Williamson 1997) ; trade may have been important for within-country distribution, but it played a much more minor role insofar as between-country distribution was concerned. 9 It seems as though the rising between-country inequality of the late 19 th century was not due to globalization.
Globalization and Inequality in the Late 20 th Century
The Heckscher-Ohlin model provides a good guide to the late 19 th century experience, in which trade was dominated by the exchange of food for manufactures, the two key regions were the Old and New Worlds, and the two key factors of production were land and labour. In the late 20 th century context, the debate has often assumed that the two key factors are skilled and unskilled labour, and that the two key regions are the North and South. Heckscher-Ohlin logic implies that, under these conditions, globalization should imply rising skill premia and inequality in the North, and falling skill premia and inequality in the South (Wood 1994 ).
These predictions have not been born out in practice: for example, although the HeckscherOhlin predictions were largely vindicated by the East Asian experience of the 1960s and 1970s, skill differentials seem to have widened in several Latin American countries following liberalization in the 1980s (Robbins 1996; Wood 1997) . Moving away from this small, oft-studied group of countries, the most comprehensive evidence on wage dispersion which we have comes from the ILO's October Surveys, summarised in Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) . Consistent with many other studies, and with Heckscher-Ohlin theory, they find sharply rising wage inequality in Britain and the US; however, as many advanced countries saw wage dispersion falling as saw it rising between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Moreover, regression analysis found wage differentials actually falling in rich and upper middle income countries during the 1980s and 1990s, and rising in lower middle income countries (as well as former Communist countries): the opposite correlation to what theory would predict.
On the other hand, overall inequality measures have been on the increase in most of the OECD since the 1970s, and particularly from the mid-1980s (Burniaux and others 1998 (Table 3) Of course, these trends do not on their own disprove simple trade theory, since distribution is driven by many factors other than globalization. For example, political developments disfavouring unions, or the entry of China with its vast reserves of unskilled workers into the world market, or the simultaneous and unrelated introduction of new technology disfavouring unskilled workers, might account for the increased Latin wage inequality (Wood 1997) . Alternatively, such factors as demography, educational developments, democratization, the collapse of Communism, and so on, may have been the most important factors influencing inequality trends. As always, we need multivariate analysis to disentangle these separate effects from each other; it is to such studies that we now turn.
Within-Country Inequality and Globalization: Cross-Country Studies
Since the publication of Deininger and Squire's (1996) dataset, there has been a proliferation of articles exploring the determinants of late 20 th century inequality across countries and over time. Many ask whether there is support for Simon Kuznets' (1955) prediction that in the initial stages of growth structural change boosts inequality, while in the later stages inequality moderates. It is, however, the relationship between inequality and openness which concerns us here; and the literature provides ambiguous answers. For example, when Higgins and Williamson (1999) regress inequality on openness (they use the Sachs and Warner (1995) dummy variable), together with the Kuznets variables and cohort size, the coefficient has a negative, but insignificant, sign. When, in addition, openness is interacted with dummy variables indicating whether a country is either in the bottom or the top third of the international labour productivity distribution, the coefficient on openness becomes negative and significant, while the interaction terms are insignificant. The latter finding suggests that standard Stolper-Samuelson theory is not applicable; the negative effect of openness on inequality suggests that globalization has a benign effect on income equality-but it turns out, however, that the size of this effect is modest.
On the other hand, Barro (2000) , using an expanded version of the Deininger-Squire data set, and a synthetic openness measure based on regressions of trade share on population, land area and trade policy, finds that openness is positively related to inequality. Moreover, an interaction term between openness and GDP per capita is negative and significant: openness raises inequality below per capita incomes of about $13,000 (1985 US dollars), and lowers it at per capita incomes above that amount. This latter finding is of course at odds with the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction regarding trade and skill differentials. Spilimbergo, Londoño and Székely (1999) provide the empirical analysis of the DeiningerSquire data set most closely related to Heckscher-Ohlin thinking. Factor prices are related to endowments and traded goods prices; the latter depend on world endowments and trade policies.
In their empirical specification, inequality is related to country endowments of capital per worker, arable land per worker, and skill intensity, relative to the 'effective' world endowment of the factor in question; to these endowment variables interacted with a synthetic trade openness measure; to openness itself; and to income and income squared.
Openness is positively correlated with inequality, although this finding is not robust to the choice of openness measure. Openness increases inequality in skill-abundant countries, consistent with the Anglo-American evidence and with the Heckscher-Ohlin model; however, openness reduces inequality in land-and capital-abundant countries, which is inconsistent with the HeckscherOhlin intuition that trade should increase the returns to land and capital in such countries, and thus raise inequality if these resources are unequally distributed.
In conclusion, the existing cross-country studies leave many questions regarding the links between openness and inequality unanswered. Spilimbergo, Londoño and Székely find that the sign of the effect depends on the choice of openness indicator; and while Higgins and Williamson find that openness is negatively associated with inequality, Barro finds a positive association. The results do not seem to be robust to either equation specification or to the choice of openness indicator.
Further research clearly seems warranted, although to date the finding that openness has at most a modest impact on inequality (in either direction) seems fairly robust. extent globalization has affected countries along each of these dimensions; and compute the effects of each of these shocks on inequality using well-specified economic models. benefit from these flows will be crucial in ensuring convergence in the future.
Between-Country Inequality and Globalization
Conclusion
What have we learned thus far?
First, globalization can have an important impact on within-country income distribution, and did during the late 19 th century. However, for the reasons outlined at the start of the paper, the relationship between globalization and inequality will vary depending on the country being considered, the dimension of globalization involved, and the distribution of endowments. countries randomly leave behind a pre-industrial past and embark on modern industrial growth, with the probability that this occurs depending on world income; and that when they do embark on such growth, they catch up on the economic leaders. The latter phenomenon may, as Lucas suggests, be due to the diffusion of resources or ideas across borders (and, by implication, be positively related to international economic integration). The model predicts a world-wide Kuznets curve, and the recent papers surveyed above suggest that while we were on the upward slope of the curve until recently, we may now have reached the turning point, and be experiencing convergence.
Third, there are many respects in which we simply do not know enough about these two phenomena, and the relationship between them. First, we do not have the commodity price data required to document the evolution of international commodity market integration across the 20 th century. If the 19 th century can yield such information to diligent scholars, then surely the 20 th century can do the same.
Second, we need more information on factor prices, which according to theory are what should be linked to globalization in the first place. Furthermore, we need data not just on different categories of wages, but on the returns to land and capital. It is the availability of such factor price data which has allowed economic historians to clearly uncover the links between international integration and income distribution in the 19 th century; aggregate measures of inequality, such as Gini coefficients, are too crude and are influenced by too many different factors for clean relationships to emerge cleanly from the data.
Third, when carrying out cross-country growth regressions, we need to do so in ways more consistent with trade theory. We need to interact our openness indicators with more country-level characteristics, as do Spilimbergo, Londoño and Székely; even more importantly, maybe, we need to enter different openness measures into our regressions, and see if different dimensions of globalization have different effects. It would also be helpful if regressions could be run with factor price ratios on the left hand side, rather than aggregate inequality indicators.
Fourth, we need to supplement cross-country exercises with more country studies, since the impact of globalization on inequality differs so greatly across countries.
Finally, the evidence may provide grounds for some optimism regarding future inequality trends. The rise in inequality over the past 200 years has been mostly due to a rise in betweencountry inequality, which is now the dominant cause of overall inequality. This trend may now have been reversed; and the 19 th century experience (and arguably the late 20 th century experience as well) suggests that this decline will be accelerated by increased globalization. Source: Higgins and Williamson (1999) , based on Deininger and Squire (1996) . Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (1999) .
